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I. Abstract
This thesis examines the way students process information
presented in an educational program. The research was
conducted by observing Lehigh University students during and
immediately following a rape education program, talking to
them informally prior to the program as well as conducting
interviews directly upon the completion of the program.
Observations and evaluations of the program and interviews
with program participants were used to examine attitude
formation.
Variables measuring cognitive and heuristic cues used
during attitude formation and information processing were
examined. Eight targeted variables were identified as
contributing to information processing by the two descriptive
models examined: the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Model
(Chaiken, 1987).
The explanatory power of the ELM and HSM were compared
using the ethnographic data gathered. The descriptive
elements of the models tested with this study's data and
problems with each were explored. Four variables were
determined to be the most important in influencing the
information processing: (1) Audience Reaction/Consensus,
(2) Motivation to Process, (3) Prior Knowledge, and (4) Issue
Involvement/Relevance. From the evidence examined concerning
these variables, support was found for the HSM as a more
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functional model of cognitive information processing. Also,
considered at some length was the influence of affect on the
process. There is a demonstrable need for further work in
examining the influence of affect on cognitive information
processing.
II. Introduction
This project will investigate and explore the
cognitive processes that occur when individuals are presented
with information designed to persuade in the context of
participating in an educational program on the Lehigh
University campus. I will examine the Elaboration Likelihood
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Models
(Chaiken, 1987; Eagly and Chaiken, 1984) as two cognitive
approaches to information processing. Both explain the
process and predict the extent to which any kind of cognitive
processing occurs. The two models differ in that the
i'
i,'
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Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) considers two distinct and
mutually exclusive "routes" to persuasion, labeled the
"central" and "peripheral". The Heuristic Systematic Model
(HSM) considers two "routes" in which parallel processing
occurs, designated the "heuristic" and the "systematic". I am
not interested in the extent or direction of change relative
to information processing but, rather, with the actual process
itself. Specifically, I will be examining the process
undertaken and observed during a persuasive educational
2
setting. While this differs from much of the previous
literature, interest in the methods of information processing
is a significant component of social psychology. Evaluation
of the data will look for evidence .supporting either the
Elaboration Likelihood Model or the Heuristic Systematic
Model.
A. Backqround
The study of attitudes and persuasion began as the
central focus of social psychology (Allport, 1935). The study
of attitudes and how they change is a theoretically rich and
empirically active area within social psychology. Recently,
there has been a resurgence in interest in cognitive
information processing theories concerning attitude formation
and change. Information processing is a major theme,
especially in the persuasion literature, and may account for
the renewed interest investigators are showing in many classic
research problems (Eagly and Himmelfarb, 1978).
Much of the work done in information processing has
been under the conceptual umbrella of persuasion and influence
research. Persuasion research investigates attitude change
that occurs in response to relatively complex messages and
situations. A majority of the literature is concerned with
how individuals in our society communicate towards the goal of
affecting some change in others.
Based to a large degree on the Yale attitude
approach , persuasive communication relies on a stirnulus-
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response paradigm. The Yale theorists argue that persuasive
messages are stimuli that provide incentives for the desired
responses (Trenholm, 1989, p. 49). The communication process
(illustrated by the Yale approach; see Appendix A, Figure 1)
can be analyzed on the basis of a wide variety of principles
which yield different sets of components (McGuire, 1969). The
process can be divided into five components: source, message,
channel, receiver, and destination. Each of these five
components contribute variables that have an effect on
attitude formation and change. By source ,variables, the Yale
group meant the attributes of the perceived source of the
message; message factors include the content and structure of
what is said. Channel factors have to do with the means by or
the context in which the message is presented. It has been
argued that the medium through which the message is
communicated has more impact on the receiver than does the
~essage content (McLuhan, 1964; McLuhan and Fiore, 1967; as
cited by McGuire, 1969).1 Receiver factors include the
characteristics of the person who is receiving the message.
Under destination factors, we include variables having to do
with the exact target of the message, that is, what is the
desired effect of the persuasive situation (McGuire, 1969).
When a communicator presents a view on an issue, the
message itself is a primary source of information, but so are
This contention is one of the key questions of this
study.
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the communicator's attributes and the audience's identity and
reactions (Eagly and Himmelfarb, 1978). This study will
examine two cognitive approaches to information processing and
persuasion. Cognitive approaches to persuasion emphasize the
receiver as an active processor of the information presented
to him/her. Developing from the Yale Communication Approach
and preceding cognitive approaches to persuasion, theories
based on social comparison and attitudes consistency were
developed in an effort to understand information processing.
B. Early Work
It has long been argued that educationa~ programs
conducted by peers (students to stUdents, etc.) may be the
most effective form of educational practice. There is
considerable body of evidence that a person is influenced by
a persuasive message to the extent that he perceives it as
coming from a source similar to himself (McGuire, 1969).
As already discussed, the medium through which the
message is communicated may have more impact on the receiver
than does the message content (McLuhan, 1964; McLuhan and
Fiore, 1967; as cited by MCGuire, 1969). Along with source
similarity factors, the influence of the medium can be
interpreted to lend credence to peers educating peers because
of the importance given to the type of language and vocabulary
used in discussions of some educational topics. Individuals
of similar experiences and backgrounds are able to convey
ideas in terms (vocabulary) conducive to increased interest
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and discussion. The increased interest and discussion could
be the result of the assimilation-contrast theory.
Put forward by Sherif and Hovland (1961), the
assimilation-contrast theory describes a "latitude of
acceptance"; a critical range of similarity around one's own
position on an issue such that if a source's opinion falls
within this range, it is perceived as lying even closer than
it really does and therefore, the individual changes his/her
own opinion towards the source's. If the source's opinion
lies outside this range (and beyond a median zone of
indifference), then the "latitude of rejection" causes the
source's opinion to be perceived as even farther away from the
individual's; the person then changes his/her opinion even
more so in the opposite direction, causing a contrast effect.
Along with the assimilation-contrast theory, the consistency-
theory approach described by McGuire (1969) can be considered
to have followed the Yale Approach and preceded the cognitive
approaches examined by my study.
The basic notion of the consistency-theory approach
to attitude change is that the individual adjusts his/her
attitudes and behavior in order to keep a maximum degree of
internal harmony with his/her belief system and between
his/her beliefs and his/her action. (McGuire, 1969). In
other words, the individual's dominant motivational concern
could be assumed to be the desire to form or to hold valid,
accurate attitudes -- that is, to attain attitudes that are
6
perceived to be congruent with relevant facts (Chaiken,
Liberman and Eagly, 1989). People are motivated to hold
correct attitudes (Festinger, 1950: as cited in Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986).
The development of cognitive approaches to
information processing is a more contemporary approach to
attitude formation and change research. It is accepted that
receivers of information may not be able to actively assess
all of the information presented in a given situation
(McGuire, 1969, 1985). Cognitive information processing is
one set of approaches which holds that receivers are
constantly sUbjected to information and must decide what is
most relevant and useful to their situation (Trenholm, 1989,
p. 53). Cognitive information processing approaches, in
developing from earlier work on attitude formation research,
have as an essential assumption that individuals have a desire
to form and hold correct opinions and attitudes about an issue
or issues. People must decide what is relevant and useful to
their situation in view of this objective.
As previously indicated, this paper will address two
descriptive models of information processing in an effort to
understand the process and targeted variables which influence
the process, as it is related to educational programs. It
will then describe the present study and the methods used to
gather the relevant data. Finally, the paper will conclude
with results, conclusions, and implications for further research.
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III. Findings from Review of contemporary Literature
A. Elaboration Likelihood Model
As noted previously, much research in the persuasion
and influence literature has focused on the cognitive analysis
of persuasion (Eagly and Chaiken, 1984). One of the more
"
influential theories is the Elaboration Likelihood Model of
Petty and Cacioppo (1986). The ELM provides a fairly general
framework for organizing, categorizing, and understanding the
basic processes underlying the effectiveness of persuasive
communications (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
After reviewing the literature on attitude
'"/
':'
I,
persistence, Petty and Cacioppo conclude that the many
different empirical findings and theories in the field might
profitably be viewed as emphasizing one of just two relatively
distinct routes to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The
first type of persuasion is that which likely results from a
person's careful and thoughtful; consideration of the true
merits of the information presented in support of an advocacy
(central route). The other type of persuasion, however, is
that which is more likely to occur as a result of some simple
cue in the persuasion context (e.g., an attractive source)
that induces change without necessitating scrutiny of the true
merits of the information presented (peripheral route) (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986).
Very simply, the central route is the approach
defined as active and cognitive elaboration of information
8
presented to a subject. This approach hinges on the sUbject
being motivated to elaborate the information or views
presented to him/her. If the subject is motivated to process,
the model contends that the individual will cognitively
examine the information presented and consider the argument
proposed very carefully with regard to any prior attitudes or
knowledge, the quality of the argument, etc. Any change in
the cognitive structure of the individual would be the result
of active consideration of the argument with an eye towards
holding correct attitudes (Petty et al., 1988, 1991). Any
change or reinforcement of existing attitudes is considered to
be relatively enduring, resistant to change, and predictive of
future behavior when the central route is undertaken.
According to the process undertaken by the
peripheral route, the sUbject is not motivated to process the
information presented to him/her (or the individual's ability
to process the information is inhibited in some way). In
light of any problem or difficulty, it is proposed that the
sUbj ect responds to peripheral or heuristic cues from the
situation. Examples of these peripheral cues would include:
attractiveness of the source (of the message/ information) ,
expertise of the source, pleasant surroundings, the number of
arguments presented, etc. The sUbject, rather than actively
processing the information presented to him/her, will rely on
these cues to decide whether or not to accept the argument
presented. If the individual uses the peripheral route based
9
upon the cues presented, any attitude shift is considered by
the ELM to be relatively temporary, susceptible to change, and
not predictive of future behavior. 2 In the following
exploration of the ELM, I will be identifying variables which
will be examined later in my study.
There are, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1986),
seven postulates or components that guide the ELM. While some
of these have been mentioned in the previous simplified
discussion, all seven will be noted and discussed further.
Postulate I: "People are motivated to hold correct
attitudes" (p. 127). Postulate I is the most important
guiding principle of the ELM. All of the descriptive and
predictive potential of the model rests on this initial
assumption.
Postulate II: "AIthough people want to hold correct
attitudes, the amount and nature of issue-relevant elaboration
in which people are willing or able to engage to evaluate a
message vary with individual and situational
factors" (p. 128). By elaboration in a persuasion context,
Petty and Cacioppo mean the extent to which a person thinks
about the issue-relevant arguments contained in a message.
When conditions foster people's motivation and ability to
engage in issue-relevant thinking, the "elaboration
likelihood" is said to be high (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
2 Please refer to Appendix A, Figure 2 for the schematic
diagram representing the ELM.
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(Conversely, if there is little or no motivation and/or
ability , an individual would be considered to be low in
"elaboration likelihood". These conditions predict which of
the two routes to persuasion (see Appendix A, Figure 2) an
individual would embark upon.
Postulate III: "Variables can affect the amount and
direction of attitude change by: (A) serving as persuasive
arguments, (B) serving as peripheral cues, and/or (C)
affecting the extent or direction of issue and argument
elaboration" (p. 132). Persuasive arguments are viewed as
bits of information contained in a communication that are
relevant to a person's sUbjective determination of the true
merits of an advocated position. Because people hold
attitudes for many different reasons, people will invariably
differ in the kinds of information they feel are central to
the merits of any position (Snyder and DeBono, 1985, as cited
in petty and Cacioppo, 1986). In researching the ELM, Petty
and Cacioppo have manipulated the quality of the arguments
such that the degree to which an argument is determined strong
or weak can be empirically examined.
As discussed earlier, another possibility is that a
simple cue in the persuasion context affects attitudes in the
absence of argument processing. Cue effect has been
manipulated by Petty and Cacioppo such that cues are presented
in persuasive settings without any argumentation to determine
the ability of cues to affect change. The last part of
11
Postulate III considers the extent or direction of issue
elaboration. It is concerned with measuring the amount of
attitude change that occurs due to the persuasive situation.
Because my study is not concerned with this measurement, but
rather the process individuals undergo in a persuasive
situation, Postulate III is not an integral part of our
discussion.
Postulate IV: "Affecting motivation and/or ability
to process a message in a relatively objective manner can do
so by either enhancing or reducing argument
scrutiny" (p. 138). Postulate IV is concerned with the
manipulation of some of the same variables targeted by this
study. In manipulating variables such as: distraction,
repetition, personal relevance/involvement, personal
responsibility and need for cognition, Petty and Cacioppo have
examined how the process is affected in different persuasive
situations. In discussing the variables targeted for
examination herein, Petty and Cacioppo's manipulations will be
addressed.
Postulate V: "As motivation and/or ability to
process arguments is decreased, peripheral cues become
relatively more important determinants of persuasion.
Conversely, as argument scrutiny is increased, peripheral cues
become relatively less important determinants of
persuasion" (p. 152). Postulate V is borne out by Petty and
Cacioppo's research (1984, 1986). The empirical research
12
examining this postulate is concerned with some of the same
variables that have been targeted for study in the following
examination.
Postulate VI: "Variables affecting message
processing in a relatively biased manner can produce either a
positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) motivational
and/or ability bias to the issue-relevant thoughts
attempted" (p. 163). Postulate VI works in conjunction with
Postulate IV because, according to Petty and Cacioppo,
variables can affect argument processing in a relatively
objective or a relatively biased manner (Petty and Cacioppo,
1981, 1986). In relatively objective processing, some
treatment variable either motivates or enables individuals to
see the strengths of cogent arguments and the flaws in
specious ones, or inhibits them from cognitively processing
the information. In relatively biased processing some
variable either motivates or enables individuals to generate
a particular kind of thought in response to a message, or
inhibits a particular kind of thought.
Obj ective elaboration is considered to be relatively
impartial and "data" driven, while biased elaboration is
considered to be directed by a relevant attitude schema which
guides processing in a manner leading to the maintenance or
strengthening of that schema (Landman and Manis, 1983, as
cited by Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). It may be considered that
the variables a subject identifies with and views as important
13
will determine whether the processing was objective or biased.
There is empirical support relating certain variables to
either objective or biased processing (Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986).
C-
Postulate VII: "Attitude changes that result mostly
from processing issue-relevant arguments (central route) will
show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of
behavior, and greater resistance to counterpersuasion than
attitude changes that result mostly from peripheral
cues" (p. 175). Postulate VII has already been considered,
and is due to Petty and Cacioppo's contention that attitude
change via the central route involves considerably more active
and cognitive work than attitude change induced by the
peripheral route. Their contention has been debated recently
and is one of the shortcomings found with the ELM that will be
discussed in the next section.
Concerns with ELM
While there is much empirical data compiled by Petty
and Cacioppo in support of the ELM, universal support for the
model does not exist. Although Petty and Cacioppo clearly
outline the types of processing strategies available to
individuals, highlight the factors that influence the use of
these strategies, and forecast the persuasive impact of these
cognitive responses, they do little to document and explain
the information processing choices humans make when evaluating
persuasive messages (stiff, 1986).
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The ELM is a model of human information processing
centering on the strategies individuals use to process
information. However, Petty and Cacioppo fail to assess
directly the cognitive processes themselves. In fact, the
validity of the model is dependent upon two unchecked
assumptions about individuals' abilities to process
information: ( 1) message recipients are forced to choose
between one of the two information processing strategies, and
(2) an individual's involvement with the message is positively
related to the processing of central cues and negatively
related to the processing of peripheral cues (stiff, 1986).
The first implied premise of the ELM is that
individuals hav~ limited capacity for actively processing
information. It is assumed that individuals are presented
with more information than they can possibly handle. Although
individuals are capable of registering incoming stimuli from
different sources, they cannot respond cognitively to
different stimuli simultaneously. As a coping mechanism,
individuals choose to actively process messages of great
import and to process less actively and systematically
messages of lesser import. Hence, messages that are high in
personal relevance receive more scrutiny than messages low in
personal relevance. This forces the recipients to make a
decision about what cues to process and thus, individuals
process either central or peripheral cues and are unaffected
by the unchosen set of cues (stiff, 1986).
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The schematic diagram of ELM (see Appendix A,
Figure 2) represents the routes individuals choose when
engaging in either central or peripheral information
processing. At each decision point along the diagram,
individuals are depicted as channeling their efforts towards
either central or peripheral processing, but not both (stiff
and Bolster, 1987). This difficulty makes the ELM most
analogous and similar to single channel processing models.
The ELM suggests that although individuals are capable of
registering incoming stimuli from different sources, they
cannot actively respond to different stimuli
simultaneously (stiff, 1986). In contrast to the single
channel view of information processing, stiff (1986) would
propose a parallel multi-channel processing extension of the
ELM incorporating the work done by Kahneman (1973).
In 1973, Kahneman introduced his elastic capacity
view of information processing (see Appendix A, Figure 3).
His model suggests that humans are multi-channel limited
capacity processors of information capable of' parallel
stimulus processing. Within the bounds of a fixed upper
limit, the amount of processing capacity available to an
individual varies and is a function of the difficulty of the
task. Individuals processing difficult tasks exert more
effort, and therefore have more capacity available than
individuals processing simple tasks (as cited in stiff, 1987).
The processing function is such that it asymptotes at high
16
levels of task difficulty (see Appendix A, Figure 3).
Individuals allocate capacity between primary and secondary
processing tasks. At low levels of task demand, the amount of
capacity used for the prima~y task is much less than the total
capacity, leaving substantial "spare" capacity for
simultaneous secondary information processing. At higher
levels of primary task demand, the amount of capacity used for
the primary task approaches total capacity leaving little
"spare" capacity for secondary information processing
(Kahneman, 1973; stiff, 1986) . Existing research on
motivation and attention provides support for Kahneman I s
model. stiff (1986) cites Bahrick, Fitts and Rankin, 1952;
Bursill, 1958; Cornsweet, 1959; Kahneman, Peavler, and Onuska,
1968 and Hockey, 1970, for research Which. has demonstrated
that high levels of arousal cause attention to be focused on
a few central aspects of the situation at the expense of less
central extraneous aspects.
Incorporating Kahneman I s model with that of the ELM,
stiff (1986) believes would result in a parallel processing
model which presents a more useful representation of the
persuasion process. In the extended ELM proposed by stiff
(1986), he contends that during persuasive message evaluation
individuals tend to focus primarily on one type of cue and
secondarily on any other(s). Attention and processing
capacity are directed toward the primary cues. Processing
capacity that is available after the primary cues have
17
received their allocation is then available for secondary cue
processing (stiff, 1986).
Postulate VII states that "Attitude changes that
result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments
(central route) will show greater temporal persistence,
greater prediction of behavior, and greater resistance to
counterpersuasion than attitude changes that result mostly
from peripheral cues" (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). It is
assumed by this postulate that processing undertaken through
the central route is therefore more positively related to
attitude formation'and change. This is the second unchecked
"
assumption of Petty and Cacioppo which has not been supported
in the literature.' The meta-analytic literature concerning
the ELM finds lack of support for the ELM's contention
concerning the relation of the central route to positive
attitude formation and change (stiff, 1986; stiff and Bolster,
1987) .
Also overlooked by the ELM is the role of affect in
cognitive information processing. The ELM seems to imply that
most affectively mediated changes in attitude are peripheral
in nature and, hence, less durable or meaningful. The role of
affect in information processing has been recently debated
(Bohner, Hunyadi, & Chaiken, 1992, under review; Petty and
Wegener, 1991; Petty, Gleicher, and Baker, 1991; Petty,
Cacioppo, Sedikides & strathman, 1988; Chaiken and stangor,
1987; Wu and Shaffer, 1987; McGuire, 1985). In contrast to
18
the interpretation of affect by the ELM, it might be
considered that affective responses can play a more central
role in persuasion: specifically, strong emotional reactions
stemming from affectively salient and accessible attitudes may
be an important spark that ignites both the generation and the
consolidation of those message relevant elaborations that
underlie persuasion according to the central route (Wu and
Shaffer, 1987).
It is a reasonable assumption that positive
affective experiences and states tend to be associated with
enhanced persuasion and more favorable attitudes, whereas
negative affective states tend to be associated with reduced
persuasion and less favorable attitudes (McGuire, 1985). This
is not accepted by Petty et ale (1988, 1991). Their contention
is that affect works as any other variable in the ELM and can
work as either an argument for issue-relevant processing, a
simple cue, by influencing the extent of information
processing, or by influencing the types of thoughts that come
to mind (Petty et al., 1991). According to stiff and Bolster
(1987), the ability of variables to act in any way that might
cause information processing in the ELM produces a model that
is unassailable and unfalsifiable. A priori, any processing
that may occur can be explained. In effect, it has produced
a model that might not truly explain the process involved in
information processing. Another cognitive information
19
processing model such as the Heuristic Systematic Model may be
examined for similarities and differences.
B. Heuristic systematic Model
Similar to the ELM in the cognitive approaches to
information processing is the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM;
Chaiken, 1987; Eagly and Chaiken, 1984; Chaiken, Liberman and
Eagly, 1989). The HSM was developed to apply to persuasion
settings in which the individual's dominant motivational
concern could be assumed to be the desire to form or to hold
valid and accurate attitudes. In other words, to attain
attitudes that are perceived to be congruent with relevant
facts, the HSM assumes that the primary processing goal of
message recipients is to assess the validity of the persuasive
messages they encounter. Moreover, the model assumes that
both heuristic and systematic processing occur in the service
of the goal assessing message validity (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken
et al., 1989).
Systematic processing is conceived as a
comprehensive, analytic orientation in which receivers access
and scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and
importance to their jUdgement task, and integrate all useful
information in forming their jUdgements. systematic
processing refers to the upper end of a data-
seeking/analysis/integration continuum and, as such, is
assumed to require more than marginal levels of effort and
20
cognitive capacity (Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989). As it
is most similar to the central route of the ELM, the
systematic mode of processing also assumes that people must be
motivated to process information and is sUbject to much of the
same problems that may occur according to the ELM when the
persuasive situation is disruptive or not conducive to
information processing.
Heuristic processing is a more limited processing
mode that demands much less active cognitive effort and
capacity than systematic processing. When processing in the
heuristic mode, individuals focus on that subset of available
information that enables them to use simple inferential rules,
schemata, or cognitive heuristics to formulate their
jUdgements and decisions. Recipients utilize minimal
informational input in conjunction with simple knowledge
structures to determine message validity quickly and
efficiently. Because heuristic processing entails minimal
amounts of data collection and analysis, it might be construed
as anchoring the low end of a systematic-processing continuum
(Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989).
The rules or heuristics that define heuristic
processing are learned knowledge structures that may be used
either self-consciously or non-self-consciously by social
perceivers (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). The basis
of heuristic processing is the idea that specific rules,
schemata, or heuristics can mediate people's attitudes or
21
other social jUdgements. It is believed by Chaiken et ale
(1989) that receivers of information sometimes use heuristics
in a highly deliberate, self-conscious fashion, but at other
times they may use heuristics more spontaneously, in a more
mindless way. They may occur simultaneously when the
systematic processing is occurring. This is not to say that
both modes always occur, only that the two modes can proceed
concurrently (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989).
Heuristic processing depends on whether cognitively
available heuristics are activated or accessed from memory
(Chaiken et al., 1989). It is assumed that the heuristics
employed in the HSM are learned knowledge structures and that
they are stored in memory. Like any other knowledge
structure, persuasion heuristics can impact on people's
attitude jUdgements only to the extent that they are
cognitively available, in other words, stored in memory.
These heuristics must then be accessible in the persuasive
setting. It is implied that situational factors that
influence the temporary accessibility of persuasion heuristics
and individual differences in the accessibility of those
heuristics should influence the persuasive impact of the
heuristic cues (Chaiken et al., 1989).
Persuasion heuristics vary not only in their
availability and accessibility; they also vary in their
strength or perceived reliability (see Higgins, in press: as
cited by Chaiken et al., 1989). While some individuals will
22
agree with particular heuristics, others may not. Even in the
area of agreement, there is discrepancy between the "weight"
given to some heuristics over others (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken
et al., 1989). Due to individual difference and situational
factors, receivers of persuasive messages will differ in the
amount of either processing mode that will occur. If
conditions exist that will allow for an individual to process
information using solely the heuristic processing (i.e. the
individual is unmotivated or unable to process
systematically), s/he will evaluate the message via heuristic
processing. The persuasive impact of heuristic cues should be
maximal in such situations (Chaiken et al., 1989). In
contrast, heuristic cues will often exert less persuasive
impact in situations where the message recipients are highly
motivated and able to process via systematic processing. In
these settings, heuristic and systematic processing are
assumed to co-occur (Chaiken et al., 1989) The degree to
which each processing method influences the complete
processing of the message may be considered to be similar to
the Kahneman elastic capacity model.
Because systematic and heuristic processing differ
in the extensiveness of processing they encourage, the HSM
assumes that: (1) systematic processing is more effortful
than heuristic processing, and (2) systematic processing both
demands and consumes cognitive capacity, whereas heuristic
processing makes relatively few capacity demands (Chaiken et
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al., 1989). The HSM does not propose a value jUdgement which
places systematic processing above heuristic processing,
rather it describes a situation similar to the Kahneman
elastic capacity model .. The concern driving this assumption
is that people are economy minded and wish to satisfy the goal
of validity seeking in the most efficient way possible.
Message recipients are motivated to hold correct attitudes,
but in the interest of efficiency, they may be inclined to
avoid systematic processing because of its effortful nature
(Chaiken et al., 1989).
In combining the desire for efficiency and minimal
effort expenditure with the motivational concern for attaining
correct attitudes, the HSM'proposes a need for a sufficient
level of confidence in defining an individual's attitude. The
"sufficiency principle" suggests the idea that efficient
information processors must strike a balance between
minimizing their processing efforts and maximizing their
judgmental confidence (Chaiken et al., 1989). The theory is
considered as a judgmental confidence continuum with a
reference point representing the person's sufficiency
threshold (the criterion point of sufficiency confidence).
Confidence levels to the left of the sufficiency point are
perceived as insufficient, and levels to the right as more
than sufficient. The sUfficiency thresholds vary as a
function of individual difference and situational factors
(Chaiken et al., 1989).
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The "sufficiency principle" can be seen as the
guiding influence on when the heuristic and systematic
processing modes occur. If the sufficiency threshold is high
on a particular topic, the need for "more" systematic
processing will have a greater impact; while if the
sUfficiency threshold is lower the need for "more" heuristic
processing will be paramount.
c. Comparison of ELM and HSM
The ELM and the HSM appear to be models with many
similarities. Both models consider and accept that
individuals are not always active processors of information
and offer similar ways of processing information based on that
consideration. Both models operate under the initial
assumption that individuals desire to hold correct attitudes
and opinions and assume similar variables contribute to the
process of attitude formation and change. The variables
targeted for study, observation, and exploration are
considered by both models to play important roles in
moderating the process undertaken by individuals in a
situation designed to persuade.
The two essential differences between the two models are
the considerations of processing modalities (parallel vs.
single channel processing) and the role of affect in
persuasion. The concern with ELM and its designated mutually
exclusive routes to persuasion and information processing has
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already been discussed at some length. The HSM has always
been considered to represent the condition of parallel
processing, i.e. both systematic and heuristic processing
occur at any time, differing only in the amount of each at any
one time (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989).
The role of affect is defined differently by the two
models. According to the ELM, affective responses would fall
under the peripheral route (Chaiken and Stangor, 1987; see
also Appendix A, Figure 2). According to the expectations for
the peripheral route to attitude change, affect could only
result in a temporary change in attitude or behavior and would
not be predictive of future behavior. Concerns with this
interpretation have already been addressed. The
interpretation of the less active route differs under the HSM.
HSM classifies affect as a component of both the heuristic and
the systematic routes with the ability to increase or decrease
persuasion via either or both modes.
D. Targeted Variables
Through my analysis of the contemporary literature,
variables which influenced the cognitive processing of
information within both models were apparent. The decision to
incorporate the following eight variables was concluded after
careful review of the literature and the initial stage (Phase
I) of the study, explained in the Methods section to follow.
1. Presenter Expertise: In discussing the Presenter
Expertise variable, it can also be understood as credibility
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and trustworthiness. Experiments on the expertise aspect of
source credibility had an early start in the attitude change
literature (McGuire, 1969). Credibility has remained a
popular area of research and many studies demonstrated the
usual main effects of credibility or expertise on opinion
change (Eagly and Himmelfarb, 1978). There is considerable
literature showing that the amount of attitude change produced
by a given message can be varied by ascribing the messages to
sources that differ on such socially desirable dimensions as
knowledge, education, intelligence, social status,
professional attainment, age, etc. (Hovland, Janis and Kelley,
1953: as cited in McGuire, 1969).
The work done by Petty and cacioppo on source credibility
has resulted in findings similar to those cited by McGuire
(1969). Petty and cacioppo (1981, 1986) have theorized that
people are more motivated to think about the arguments given
by a highly credible communicator when the proposal is
contained in an attempt to derive an educated position on an
issue. The highly credible source is seen as a potential
source of "correct" information; as such, his/her arguments
are perceived as worthy of thoughtful evaluation on the part
of the recipient (stoltenberg and McNeill, 1984). Heesacker,
Petty and Cacioppo (1983) have obtained supportive evidence
that a highly credible source can increase sUbjects'
message-relevant thinking more than one of low credibility.
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The HSM considers the factor of source credibility to act
primarily as a heuristic processing cue. Source credibility
and source expertise are considered to be associated with the
heuristic cue designated by Chaiken et ale (1989), "Expert's
statements can be trusted." As a consequence, message
recipients may agree more with expert communicators without
having fully absorbed the semantic content of the persuasive
arguments (Chaiken et al., 1989). According to the HSM
literature, as a heuristic cue, source/presenter expertise
will accomplish more in situations that are not conducive to
a large degree of systematic processing (Chaiken et al.,
1989) .
The differences between the two models on the influence
of Presenter Expertise would seem to indicate that there may
be more than one way of explaining the effect of this variable
with regard to information processing (Petty and cacioppo,
1986) . I expect that Presenter Expertise will reflect
conditions similar to those found within the assimilation-
contrast theory of Sherif and Hovland (1961) discussed
previously. It may also be remembered that discussion of the
channel component of the Yale Communication Approach included
the concept that the channel or medium of a message may have
a great impact on persuasive messages. It is in examining
Presenter Expertise that support for these claims may be
found. The presenters of the educational program are peers of
the participants and, therefore, may be able to influence
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cognitive processing of the information presented in a more
heuristic-active mode than might be expected with the ELM.
The variable of Presenter Expertise as attended to in an
educational program may indicate that HSM is a more plausible
explanatory model of information processing.
2. Presenter Likability: Considered comparable in many
ways to Presenter Expertise, the variable of Presenter
Likabili ty also tends to support the concept described by
Sherif and Hovland (1961). It seems reasonable to hypothesize
that the more the recipient of a message liked the source of
a persuasive message, the more he would change his/her beliefs
toward the position the source is advocating (McGuire, 1969).
McGuire cites numerous studies on behalf of this hypothesis. 3
The proposition that liking the source enhances his/her
persuasive valence is a basic prediction of most of the
consistency theories of human behavior (McGuire, 1969).
Aspects of the relationship between liking for the source
and amount of change in attitudes have also been investigated
in connection with reference group theory (McGuire, 1969). An
individual belongs to and identifies with a reference group
which mayor may not have an effect on his/her behavior and
attitudes. If the desire to hold correct views is defined as
the desire to hold correct views according to a specific
3 French and snyder, 1959; Griffin and Ehrlich, 1963;
Horowitz, Lyons and Perlmutter, 1951; Samson and Insko, 1964;
Sherwood, 1965; Thrasher, 1954; Wallach, KogaD and Bern, 1962.
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reference group, then the factor of source/presenter
likability becomes very important.
The ELM considers source likability to act as a
peripheral cue to attitude change. There has not been as much
research in the area of source likability as the other factors
investigated. Manipulations of persuasive situations have
included attractive and well-liked celebrity sources in an
effort to demonstrate the influence of source cues in
persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, Petty et al. 1988).
These have demonstrated some interaction between well-liked
sources of information and persuasion via the peripheral
route.
According to the HSM, source likability acts as a
heuristic cue and promotes processing via the heuristic mode.
The HSM proposes that independent variables (e. g., source
factors, such as source likability) indirectly affects
yielding to a message's conclusion and, therefore, persuasion
via their direct impact on systematic processing. In the
heuristic mode, such variables may directly influence the
recipient's willingness to accept the message's conclusion
without necessarily influencing the acceptance of the
arguments (Chaiken, 1980). Message recipients may agree with
likable communicators because they may employ the rule that
"people generally agree with people they like" (Chaiken et ale
1989, Chaiken, 1980). The acceptance and formation of a
heuristic rule may derive from past experiences with others or
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may stem from another rule which supports a consistent
association between the concepts of liking and interpersonal
similarity (Stotland and Canon, 1972: as cited by Chaiken,
1980) .
Similar to the expectations with the variable of
Presenter Expertise, this variable of Presenter Likabili ty may
have an important effect on the cognitive processing
undertaken during the program. Both of the models would view
the variable of Presenter Likability as influencing the
audience via the less active, more peripheral routes. If the
effect of the variable of Presenter Likability is important to
the subj ects, support for the HSM will be evident. The
measure of the effect of this variable, as with Presenter
Expertise may also be suggestive of the social comparison
model, as well as the assimilation-contrast effect.
3. Message/Argument Length: One way that recipients
decide whether to accept a communication is to evaluate the
argumentation it contains (Eagly and Himmelfarb, 1978). More
attitude change research has focused on message variables than
on any of the other communication variables (MCGuire, 1969).
Insko et al. (1976) presented subjects with differing amounts
of argumentation and obtained a negative function (as cited by
Eagly and Himmelfarb, 1978). The greater the amount of
argumentation the less it was accepted and analyzed under
certain conditions.
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Based upon previous research, Petty and Cacioppo (1986)
consider message length directly consistent with message
comprehensibility. Petty and Cacioppo's research often
examines the relationship between differences in the argument
strength and the length of the argument. The longer an
argument, the more in depth and stronger it is assumed to be
according to the research findings of Petty and
Cacioppo(1986) . The longer the argument, the greater the
impact on information processing, especially undertaken along
the central route.
Researchers have identified the heuristic cue "Length
implies strength" (Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken and Stangor,
1987; Chaiken, Axsom, Liberman and Wilson, 1992, under
review). Applied to persuasion, this heuristic reflects the
belief that long messages or messages composed of many
arguments are more valid than short messages or messages with
few arguments (Chaiken et al., 1992, under review).4 Previous
research has shown that long (vs. short) versions of the same
message are more persuasive when capacity for systematic
processing is not high (Wood et al., 1985: as cited by Chaiken
et al., 1992) and that messages containing many (vs. few)
arguments are more persuasive when motivation for systematic
processing is not high (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984).
4 While the HSM incorporates the two factors of message
length and message number under one basic heuristic, the ELM
interprets the two factors differently. Therefore, this
thesis will address each variable separately.
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since both models differ in their expectations for the
importance of Message/Argument Length, my study expects to
witness participants being influenced to different degrees.
In the "natural" setting of an educational program, sUbjects
will self-report their interpretations of the length and
strength of the arguments presented. Any self reporting may
lead to less sterile considerations of the variable described
as Message/Argument Length than would be expected in the
laboratory setting.
4. Message/Argument Number: Much of the literature,
including the HSM, examines the concepts of message length and
message number as similar constructs. The exception is the
ELM of Petty and Cacioppo (1986). The ELM considers the
number of messages/arguments presented to act primarily as a
peripheral cue towards information processing. Message
complexity and length are considered to increase central route
processing (especially when motivation to process is high),
yet if motivation to process is determined to be low,
increasing the number of arguments will increase the
likelihood of peripheral route processing (Petty and Cacioppo,
1986; Petty et al., 1987). The HSM would consider the
variable to effect change via the heuristic "Length implies
strength" (Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987;
Chaiken, Axsom, Liberman and wilson, 1992, under review).
since both of the models examined expect similar
processing routes to be undertaken, this study would expect
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comparable effects for either model in interpretation of the
f
impact of the variable Message/Argument Number. As with the
variable Message/Argument Length, sUbjects will be petitioned
for their self-reported interpretations of the number of
arguments presented. Again the less than "sterile"
considerations of this variable may deviate from the results
that would be expected in the laboratory setting.
5. Audience Reaction/consensus: Previous research on
the impact of audience reaction on the persuasibility of
message recipients has produced conflicting results (Axsom,
Yates and Chaiken, 1987). The concern an individual may have
for maintaining a consensus with his/her reference group is a
consideration of conformity literature (McGuire, 1969). The
initial assumption of the cognitive information processing
theories is that an individual wishes to hold correct or valid
attitudes (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986;
McGuire, 1969, 1985). If the valid or correct attitudes are
defined by the reference group, the individual may be more
influenced towards conformity than general persuasibility
(McGuire, 1969).
In the ELM, the variable of Audience Reaction/Consensus
is considered and addressed by Postulate VI. While the
variable of audience consensus is not fully considered by
Petty and Cacioppo, the influence of an individual's reference
group biases the processing because the initial group
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attitude's become the guiding schema for information
processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
It may be that audience effects typically are
heuristically mediated and thus occur primarily when
motivation or ability for systematic processing is low (Axsom
et al., 1987). That is, individual's tend to be influenced by
an overheard audience when using the heuristic cue "if other
people think the message is correct (incorrect), then it is
probably valid (invalid)". Thus, the audience response cue
may directly affect agreement with a speaker's message because
it is taken as prima facie evidence that the speaker's
conclusion is valid (Chaiken, 1987; Axsom et ale 1987).
In consideration of the conformity research, this study
would expect to discern a substantial impact for the Audience
Reaction/Consensus variable. I would expect that, due to the
nature of the educational program, the influence of Audience
Reaction/Consensus may be more important and noticeable than
examined in the literature on ELM. The HSM considers the
variable to be heuristically motivated influence.
6. Motivation to Process: Both the ELM and the HSM hold
that motivation is a major factor in information processing.
The central route to persuasion defined by the ELM hinges on
the variable, motivation (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). An
individual must be motivated to process the information
presented or that individual will proceed via the peripheral
route to persuasion (see Appendix A, Figure 2).
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A large component of the motivation to process variable
is what Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe (1955) called the "need for
cognition", which they described as "a need to structure
relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways. It is a
need to understand and make reasonable the experiential
world" (as cited by Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Other early
research on this factor suggested that individuals high in the
need for cognition were more discriminating and more motivated
to think about persuasive communications (Petty and Cacioppo,
1986).
As already discussed, motivation to process also affects
the systematic processing that occur under the HSM. Heuristic
cues exert a significantly greater persuasive impact when
motivation for systematic processing is low than when
motivation to process is high (Chaiken et al., 1989; Axsom et
al., 1987; Chaiken, 1980; Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1988).
Therefore, it suggests that systematic processing is more
likely under conditions of high motivation.
According to the similar interpretations of the two
models, I would presume that the variable Motivation to
Process will be observable and important in the cognitive
processing that occurs during the educational program. The
observed variations in motivation should allow for discussion
of the differences in processing methods for individuals low
in motivation versus individuals high in motivation. It is
anticipated that Motivation to Process will be of major
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exploration of the two modelsimportance for myC)studytS
effectiveness.
7. Prior Knowledge: One of the most important variables
affecting information processing activity is the extent to
which a person has an organized structure of knowledge
(schema) concerning an issue (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). To
change an attitude it is generally accepted that another
attitude must exist (McGuire, 1969). Hunter, Levine and Sayer
(1976) consider a "double comparison" model, which postulates
that persons compare their attitudes not only to the attitudes
expressed in the message but also to their own attitudes
associated with concepts immediately above in their
hierarchical structure of concepts (as cited in Eagly and
Himmelfarb, 1978).
The general interpretation of the Prior Knowledge
variable in the ELM is that it affects the individual t s
ability to process the information presented. The more issue
relevant knowledge an individual has, the more that individual
tends to be able to counterargue communications opposing their
initial positions and to cognitively bolster congruent
messages. Prior Knowledge produces biased scrutiny of the
information presented (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
The HSM mirrors the ELM in the desire for an individual
to have ability as well as motivation to process information.
It is Prior Knowledge (or lack thereof) that may be a factor
in determining the degree that a persuasive argument is
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examined primarily by the systematic or the heuristic mode
(Chaiken et al., 1989). It has been argued that capacity
(Prior Knowledge) for systematic processing is often lower in
real-world settings than in the laboratory persuasion study
(Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987; Eaglyand
Chaiken, 1984). If capacity (lack of prior knowledge) is low,
individuals may then turn to simple decision rules
(heuristics) rather than systematic processing. Asd~~
by the HSM interpretation of Prior Knowledge, real-world
settings may inhibit the amount of systematic processing. In
the case of the I.C.A.R.E. educational program, it is my
assumption that knowledge about the topic of the program is
fairly extensive and, therefore, will not inhibit cognitive
processing, but rather enhance systematic/central route
processing. The topic of date and acquaintance rape education
is a current concern in society and there is a great deal of
information available to the general public. The observable
degree of Prior KnowLedge evident during the study will be
used to examine the route of cognitive processing employed by
I
the sUbjects. It is expected that the sUbjects will have a
great deal of Prior KnowLedge and, therefore, will engage in
more systematic or central processing.
8. Issue Involvement/Relevance: This variable has been
examined under many different labels in social psychology.5
5 "Ego-involvement" (Rhine and Severance, 1970; Sherif,
Sherif and Nebergall, 1965), " issue-involvement" (Kiesler,
Collins and Miller, 1969), "personal involvement" (Apsler and
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consistent with these varied definitions, Issue
Involvement/Relevance can be explained as the extent to which
an advocacy has "intrinsic importance" (Sherif and
Hovland, 1961) or "personal meaning" (Sherif et al., 1973).
Issue involvement and personal relevance occurs when people
expect the issue "to have significant consequences for their
"
own lives" (Apsler and Sears, 1968: as cited in Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986).
As discussed by Sherif and Hovland (1961; Sherif et al.,
1965) in the assimilation-contrast theory, involvement affects
attitudes via "latitude of acceptance" and "latitude of
rejection". Involvement was believed to be associated with a
greater probability of message rejection. Individuals were
expected to hold expanded "latitudes of rejection" as personal
involvement increased, because incoming messages would be more
likely to fall within the unacceptable range of a person's
attitude continuum (Eagly and Manis, 1966: as cited in Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986).
The ELM predict that as personal relevance (and
involvement) increases, individuals become more motivated to
process the issue relevant arguments presented. As the
personal consequences of an advocacy increase, it becomes more
important for people to form a veridical opinion because the
consequences of being incorrect are greater. Therefore
Sears, 1968; Sherif, Kelly, Rodgers, Sarup and Tittler, 1973)
and "personal involvement" (as cited in Petty and Cacioppo,
1986) .
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because of the greater consequences, individuals should be
more motivated to engage in the active cognitive work
necessary to evaluate the true merits of the proposal (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986). It is expected that when a persuasive
communication is on a topic of high personal relevance,
attitude change will be governed mostly by thoughtful
consideration of the issue relevant arguments presented
(central route). On the other hand, when a message is on a
topic of low personal relevance, it is expected that the
peripheral features of the persuasion situation would be more
potent (Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman, 1981). Empirical
research gathered by Cialdini et ale (1976) (as cited in Petty
et ale 1979, Petty et ale 1986, Petty and Cacioppo 1979, 1984)
supports an interpretation of this type.
The general interpretation of issue involvement and
relevance for the HSM is similar to that of the ELM. Subjects
that are determined to be high in personal involvement are
expected to employ the systematic processing mode to a greater
degree than the heuristic mode (Chaiken et al., 1989).
However, the HSM, while supporting some of the research above,
also considers the factor of issue involvement and personal
relevance to encourage selective heuristic processing in some
cases. Rather than solely concentrating on the systematic
processing of the issue relevant messages, research on health
messages and fear appeals suggests that people defensively
reject highly relevant messages (Liberman and Chaiken, 1992,
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in press). concentrating on selective heuristic cues
individuals may reject highly relevant messages rather than
systematically processing the arguments presented (Jepson and
Chaiken, 1990). Again there is support for the concept of the
HSM as a parallel processing model, because both processing
modes may occur at the same time.
Both of the models concentrate extensively on the
variable Issue Involvement/Relevance. According to the
models' interpretation, subjects who demonstrate a high level
of issue involvement or personal relevance will actively
engage in cognitive processing of the information. The
converse is also expected. It is anticipated that individual
levels of issue involvement and personal relevance will be
estimated and the differences presumed by the models will be
manifest in this study.
IV. Methodological Gap in the Literature
All of the literature examined, explored information
processing in an experimental setting. In previous
examinations of the ELM and the HSM, the targeted variables
were manipulated to control for each variable at a specific
instance. If the informational or persuasive setting is
always going to be in a laboratory situation, the experimental
methods thus far described is not only possible, but
preferable. It not only allows for examination of variables,
but analysis of the extent to which the variable affected the
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persuasion and information processing (stiff, 1987; stiff and
Bolster, 1987; Johnson and Eagly, 1989: as cited in Mongeau
and stiff, 1991, in press).
Educational programs do not occur in a laboratory setting
and do not easily allow for the manipulations of the variables
influencing information processing. In an effort to
accurately and effectively assist in the evaluation of the
inf~rmation processing that occurs during educational
programs, observations and interviews permit a more complete
measurement and evaluation. By having individuals describe
what occurred for them while participating in an educational
program, it is possible to complete a more comprehensive
evaluation of which factors were the most important in
conveying the information and inducing persuasion.
v. Methods
To explore the question of how individuals process
information, I will consider the educational program regarding
date and acquaintance rape awareness as presented by the
I.C.A.R.E. (Individuals Concerned About Rape Everywhere) group
on the Lehigh University campus. The program presents
participants with information concerning awareness of date and
acquaintance rape on college campuses and promotes
communication and awareness in an effort to change attitudes
on this issue.
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A. subjects
The sUbjects chosen to participate in the interview
portion of the study were selected by two different methods.
The subjects interviewed from the first half of the 1993
spring semester's programs were volunteers recruited by the
researcher immediately following the program. Due to the
anticipated problems of "volunteer ism" and "expectancy"
biases, during the second half of the semester's programs the
sUbjects were selected in a different manner. In the second
half of the semester, individuals were randomly chosen by the
researcher based on selecting at least a 20 percent sample
from the total number of participants observing the I.C.A.R.E
program. I chose one in every five participants. Immediately
following the completion of the program, I approached these
individuals and asked if they would be willing to take part in
my study. Along with these subjects, a certain portion of the
audience also presented themselves as volunteers who were
willing to assist in the study. These combined recruitment
strategies enabled me to interview 22 percent of the
population participating in the 1993 spring semester
I.C.A.R.E. programs.
B. Procedure
The study was conducted in two phases. During the
fall semester of 1992 (Phase 1), the targeted variables were
identified by means of a thorough review of the literature and
these variables were incorporated into the on-going I. C.A. R. E.
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program evaluations. The observations and interviews for the
study then commenced during the spring semester of 1993
(Phase 2).
The variables determined to be of importance from
the review of the literature were included as components of
the general I.C.A.R.E. program evaluations early in the 1992
fall semester (see Appendix B). Each of the questions on the
program evaluation are related to at least one of the targeted
variables.
The evaluation questions included items concerned
with the targeted variables: Presenter Expertise (questions 1
and 2), Presenter Likability (question 3), Message/Argument
Length (question 4), Message/Argument Number (question 5),
Audience Reaction/Consensus (question 7), Motivation to
Process (question 9), Prior Knowledge (question 10), Issue
Involvement/Relevance (questions 6, 8, and 11). An
independent test was conducted in the early 1992 fall
semester, in which the evaluation forms were introduced
following an I.C.A.R.E. program and individuals were
interviewed to assess the interpretability and clarity of the
questions. The participants interviewed completely understood
the questions and comprehended what the questions were meant
to evaluate, providing support for the validity of the
evaluation questions.
Throughout the 1992 fall semester, participants in
the I.C.A.R.E. program completed the evaluations following
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participation in the program. From these evaluations a data
base was established and an item analysis was conducted that
helped to formulate the "In-depth Interview Format" and the
questions used in the observatory and interview stage during
the 1993 spring semester, Phase 2 (see Appendix B) . The
questions contained in the "In-depth Interview Format"
concentrated on the eight variables previously identified in
the literature review and discussed earlier in this thesis.
During Phase 2 of the study, observations and
interviews were conducted during and immediately following
I.C.A.R.E. programs in the 1993 spring semester. In order to
establish credibility for my attendance and participation in
these programs, I introduced the program and discussed my
research briefly at the beginning of the sessions. 6
I explained to the participants that I would not be actively
taking part or contributing to the program, but solely
observing the proceedings. I also explained that I would be
approaching some of the participants immediately following the
program to ask them to participate in the study.
While observing the program, I usually positioned
myself to the periphery of the room and quietly observed the
participants and the interactions between participants and
with the facilitators of the program. In an effort to refrain
from inhibiting the natural interactions within the aUdience,
6 I am a former presenter/facilitator of the I.C.A.R.E.
program and have been the coordinator of the program for the
last two academic years (1991-1993).
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I did not take place in the discussions, nor did I take notes
too conspicuously. I felt that any contribution that I made
to the discussion at hand would influence the direction of the
audience interaction. As well, I did not want the audience to
think I was transcribing every word and comment made during
the program, as it might influence what was expressed aloud by
members of the audience during the more interactive parts of
the program.
In noting the different reactions (Audience
Reaction/Consensus) to the materials presented, differences in
Motivation to Process, Prior KnowLedge and Issue
Involvement/Relevance were evident. All observations made
during the course of the educational program were concisely
noted into a tape recorder while those individuals to be
interviewed were completing the I.C.A.R.E. program
evaluations, as well as preparing the relevant parts of the
"Informed Consent Forms" (see Appendix B). These brief notes
were expanded upon following the interview sessions.
The interviews were conducted immediately following
the completion of the I.C.A.R.E. program. The interviews were
conducted in an informal manner within a group format. While
ideally the interviews should have been conducted on a one-to-
one basis, constraints on time and sUbjects availability made
informal group interviews more accessible. In an effort to
make the interview process consume as little time out of the
sUbjects' busy lives as possible, the content of the
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interviews were recorded by the researcher, only after all of
the subjects agreed. The tapes of the interviews were then
transcribed by the researcher along with the notes on the
observations of the program atmosphere. There is nothing on
either the tapes or the transcriptions which would indicate or
identify any individual out of the population, therefore, the
subjects' confidentiality has been preserved.
The interviews were unconstrained as to the
direction or focus of the conversations. While the "In-depth
Interview Format" was the initial basis of the discussion, the
direction of the elaboration was left to the groups
discretion, with only nominal guidance by the interviewer.
The free exchange of interpretations allowed for the
researcher to explore naturally the process the sUbjects
)
.1
i
progressed through during the educational program. While
concern for the problems inherent in group interview sessions,
e.g. group conformity and expectancy biases, were very real
possibilities, the group's varied and open discussions
indicated to the interviewer honest and mindful responses
which demonstrated varying degrees of processing.
By conducting the research for this study in an
ethnographic manner, I looked specifically at how individuals
presented with information reacted to the information and
interviewed subjects to determine what cognitively (or maybe
not cognitively) occurred during the process. By examining
what participants in an educational program identified as most
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important to them, the structure of these programs can be
altered to encourage more efficient processing of information.
The sUbjects were asked a question in the interview session
regarding their attention to specific variables, as well as
their personal perception of the importance of the different
variables. The variables were measured with respect to what
degree the sUbjects attended to them, as well as, the relative
importance of the specific variables to the information
processing which occurred. A relationship between these
measurements was tested for significance by the use of the
Chi-square statistic. The measurements on the variables were
dichotomous, not continuous, and therefore, allowed for the
reliance in this study on the Chi-square and its probability.
VI. setting the Scene
Observations
This section of the study discusses the qualitative
observations conducted during the I.C.A.R.E. presentations
which occurred throughout the 1993 spring semester at Lehigh
university. In conducting the observations, I positioned
myself to one side of the room in which the program was
occurring. This enabled me to observe the majority of the
audience throughout the program. The situations observed, as
well as the interviews which followed, seemed to lend some
measure of support for the HSM and the idea that systematic
and heuristic processing was occurring at the same time.
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I observed all of the 1993 Spring semester
I.C.A.R.E. programs and compiled field notes about the
settings and situational factors found at each program as well
as the audience interactions during and succeeding the
programs. These situations offered evidence concerning the
information.
Knowledge, and (4) Issue Involvement/Relevance. Support for
Reaction/Consensus, (2) Motivation to Process, (3) Prior
(1) Audiencevariables:importantprimarily
lines. What is interesting to note, is that the educational
program seemed to induce information processing in similar
ways regardless of their position of the topic and the
education and awareness in this study varied along gender
and interviews conducted. It is not surprising to note that
the differences in attitudes expressed concerning rape
the impact of affect was also evident in both the observations
four
1. settings and situational Factors: All of the
programs, with one exception, took place in fraternity houses.
The audience was comprised of members of that fraternity and
an invited sorority. The male to female ratio of these
programs were roughly equal, though occasionally there were
more female audience members than male members (despite the
fact that the males were in their "house"). This may be due
to the nature of the educational program being about rape and
rape awareness. The men may consider the program to be of
more concern for women than for themselves. Also to be
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considered is the fact that on the average, sorority
membership is numerically larger than fraternity membership.
The audiences were mixed with regard to class
distribution. The membership of the audiences were comprised
primarily of underclassmen. 7 The predominance of underclass
students is probably due to the fact that sororities and
fraternities involved made attendance to the program mandatory
for the pledges of the "houses". Another factor may be that
upperclassmen probably had already been exposed to this
educational program at some other point in their university
careers.
The settings varied among the different programs.
The majority of the programs took place in the common living
area of the host fraternity, with one notable exception. One
of the programs observed took place in the large open barroom
of the host fraternity. In the majority of the observed
programs, the setting was suitable with adequate and fairly
comfortable seating for the audience. In the former instance,
the setting was uncomfortable and provided poor seating
arrangements.
The seating arrangements during the programs were
interesting to observe. The men divided themselves into two
sections. The men sat in either the front of the audience or
the very rear of the audience. This would seem to indicate
7 By this designation, "underclassmen" refers to
freshmen and sophomores and "upperclassmen" refers to juniors
and seniors.
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the degree of motivation to attend the program, however, later
interviews did not confirm assumption. Individuals chosen for
interviews from both the front and the rear of the audience
displayed similar degrees of motivation to attend the program.
The women by default sat in the middle of the
audience since the men had usually claimed their respective
seats before the women arrived. The seating arrangement had
the advantage of removing any chance of a strictly bipolar
gender-based debate from occurring, this also produced an
interesting setting. The seating arrangement had the effect
of making the women involved in the discussion engage in
debates and react to statements from the front and back. The
arrangement appeared to intimidate many of the women during
the program as demonstrated by the fact that some female
sUbjects interviewed did not vocalize much during the program,
but in the smaller interview groups were demonstrably more
vocal.
In about half of the programs observed, the large
numbers of individuals in the audience made it difficult to
facilitate the program. The presenters had difficulty in
controlling the "side" conversations and some of the
information presented may not have been heard by the entire
audience. On the other hand, certain interactive parts of the
program were attended to by the entire aUdience, as well as
some of the lecture-based segments of the program which were
stressed by the facilitators. Of greater interest than the
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setting and situational factors were the interactions within
the audience during the program.
2. Audience Interaction: There was not a great deal of
interaction between the members of the fraternities and the
sororities before the programs. This may be due to the
general trend of the sorority members arriving later for the
programs. Following the program there was a greater amount of
"friendly" interaction between the groups, with quite a bit of
discussion about the program.
The interactions, discussions and debates that
occurred during the course of the program were of two types:
those that occurred between audience members and the
facilitators of the program, and those that developed within
'j
'I
the audience itself. The presenter teams facilitating the
programs are always composed of at least one male and one
female so that the audience would not feel that the issue is
only a concern for one gender. This fact did not prohibit
the audience from arguing with the presenters on gender-
related issues.
The scope of the interaction between the presenters
and the audience focused on separate issues. The males were
concerned with legality and possible repercussions of any
activity they might be involved in with individuals of the
opposite sex, while the females were concerned with the issue
of date and acquaintance rape and the implications for their
own safety. The majority of the males in the audiences
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indicated that their motivation to process the information
regarding the topic focused on receiving reassurances that
they were not going to become victims of "false" reporting of
rape. The women in the audiences were more concerned about
themselves being victims of the crime and wanted to discuss
the issue in an effort to understand their own vulnerability.
The difference in focus on the issue presented
between males and females was the basis for much of the
interaction between the audience and the presenters and also
acted as the catalyst for the debates within the audience.
The interactive nature of the program targeted the difference
in focus and encouraged interaction within audiences. The
program was set up so that discussion and debates are
encouraged between individuals with differing opinions.
As noted, the women were in an awkward situation
seated as they were between two groups of men. They also had
to contend with being in the "house" of the host fraternity.
The potentially intimidating environment did not prevent some
of the women from debating with the men about the issues
presented. The interaction between males and females focused
on different concepts on the issue of responsibility. The
presenters attempted to create a fairly interactive atmosphere
in order to direct discussion. Polarization generally
occurred along gender lines. The discussions tended to be
general group discussions with the different perspectives
supporting their interpretations as the conversation
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continued. While the educational program presented the
audience with facts, definitions, and concrete information,
the audience directed the program into focusing on differing
opinions and views on the issue. In the observations and
discussion during the interviews, the difference in focus
regarding the presentation influenced the evaluation of the
targeted variables. The males had a narrower, specific self-
interest regarding the topic, while the females had a more~
general broad interest and concern about the presentation.
This distinction was manifest in consideration of the
variables examined by the study.
VII. Results and Discussion
What an individual pays attention to should be an
indication of how that individual is processing the
information presented to him/her (Petty et al. 1988, 1991).
An individual who holds attitudes favorable to the information
presented would be more likely to undertake processing via a
systematic/central route, whereas an individual who holds
unfavorable attitudes would process information via a
heuristic/peripheral route. According to the ELM, the
processing of information would occur either via central or
peripheral routes (mutually exclusive), while the HSM would
consider both systematic and heuristic routes to be
involved (parallel routes). The HSM contends that the
individual involved may be influenced by one of the paths to
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a greater degree, but both routes are always involved. The
targeted variables identified in both models will be examined
to determine their contribution to the information processing
that occurs during the I.C.A.R.E. program.
One element that is targeted within this project is the
role of affect. The literature indicates that affect may
change the way in which information is processed regarding the
change or affirmation of previously held attitudes (McGuire,
1985; Wu and Shaffer, 1987; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987). The
ELM places affect as a component of the peripheral route and
considers it of relatively little importance, while the HSM
considers it as a part of both the systematic and heuristic
paths and relatively important dependent upon the context of
the information presented. If the ELM is correct, variables
associated with affect should not be found at the same time or
to the same degree of importance as the other variables
associated with central route processing. The interviews were
structured to examine the targeted variables and the role of
affect within each of the models.
The interview sessions were conducted immediately
following the conclusion of the programs, in small groups and
taped (with the interviewer transcribing the tapes at a later
date). The interviews followed in a general way the outline
found in Appendix B, entitled "In-Depth Interview Format".
The questions posed to the group were concerned with specific
targeted variables and the perception of the variables'
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relative importance, but the group was not restricted in what
they could discuss. It was obvious that certain variables
were particularly important to the subjects. These will be
discussed in depth later in this paper.
The small interview groups were divided equally by gender
(males: N=18, females: N=19) and represented approximately 22
percent of the population attending educational programs this
semester. The subjects were randomly chosen according to the
procedure indicated in the Methods section of the paper. In
general, 62 percent (N=23) of the sUbjects indicated that they
had actively thought about the information they had received
when they were asked a question regarding their level of
cognitive processing. The focus of the subjects' attention
differed along the gender distribution as noted in the
Observations section. seventy percent (N=26) of the subjects I
considered the information important enough that it should be
cognitively processed. There was no statistical significance
between the subjects perceived amount of cognitive processing
(thinking about the program) and the perceived importance of
the message (X2=2.222, p>.10).
Two questions were asked concerning the variable,
Presenter Expertise. In general, 76 percent (N=28) of the
subjects agreed that the presenters were credible. There was
no significance in the relationship between Presenter
Expertise and its perceived importance to information
processing (X2=1.498, p>.20). The discussions displayed this
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trend. The sUbj ects did not considered Presenter Expertise an
issue of importance. There was no elaboration, discussion or
essential disagreement about the perceived importance or the
perception of the presenters credibility.
Presenter Likability was more an issue for debate than
Presenter Expertise. Approximately 57 percent (N=21) of the
sUbjects considered the presenters likable, while the
remainder of the sample varied in their interpretation of the
presenters likability. There was no statistically
significant relationship between Presenter Likability and the
observed importance of Presenter Likability during processing
(X2=O.719, p>.30). The observed debate fell along the same
lines evidenced during the interactions between the audience
and the presenters noted in the Observations. The comments
focused on the fact that the presenters did not take sides
during the discussion. The comments included: "I didn't know
where the presenters stood ... I mean were they just taking a
position to cause discussion or what?" and "The presenters
never told us what the right answer on the issues was".
Questions considering the length of the program and the
number of "informational" arguments presented,
Message/Argument Length and Message/Argument Number, were
asked. Seventy-eight percent (N=29) of the sUbj ects disagreed
that the amount of material covered (Message/Argument Number)
was too extensive. The relationship between Message/Argument
Number and its importance to information processing was
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significant (X2= 13.244, p/t..001). The individuals who
considered Message/Argument Number to be important to
information processing, almost entirely responded that the
amount of information was not too considerable.
sixty-eight percent (N=25) of the sUbjects agreed that
the program was not too long (Message/Argument Length). There
was no statistical significance between Message/Argument
Length and the person's perception of the importance of
information processing (X2=O .573, p>.30) • During the
interviews, there was one notable exception to the idea that
the program that was not too long. This exception occurred
for the program situated in the fraternity barroom. The
uncomfortable atmosphere of this program may have influenced
the participants, since more people said the program was too
long. (It should be noted that the program lasted no longer
than any other program, and was in actuality shorter in
duration than many of the others.) This incident supports
the argument that the environment has much to do with the
process of persuasion and information processing.
A. Targeted Variables of Significance
1. Audience Reaction/consensus: The targeted
variable Audience Reaction/consensus emerged as very important
to the subjects of this study. Eighty-seven percent (N=32) of
the sUbject thought that the opinions and viewpoints expressed
by the audience were more important than the viewpoints and
opinions of the program facilitators. It was considered to be
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the most important factor by many of the subjects (48%, N=18).
The test of the relationship between Audience
Reaction/Consensus and the importance of this variable was
significant p<. 001) • The trend of this
relationship was that if a subject considered Audience
Reaction/Consensus important sjhe would pay attention to the
discussion of the audience. The majority of the participants
listened to the Audience Reaction/Consensus, regardless of
their perception of its importance.
Table 1: Relationship of Audience Reaction/Consensus
and Importance to Processing
-Number Variable Variable
-Row% Important to Not Important
-Column% Information to Information
X2=13.960, p<.OOl Processing Processing
Audience 18 14
Reaction/Consensus 56% 44%
Important 90% 82%
Audience 2 3
Reaction/Consensus 40% 60%
Important 10% 18%
While agreement existed as to the extreme importance
of Audience Reaction/Consensus at least within the interviews,
the subjects responded with a variety of reasons about the
importance of audience consensus. These included: "These are
my friends" (N=25), "The people here are like me and have
similar outlooks" (N=13), "The people I am friends with have
the same feelings as I do" (N=7) , "Some of the audience
members had personal experiences that made sense with what
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rthey were saying" (N=ll), and "I could tell that meant a lot
to <Name> so it is important to me" (N=8). 8
The greatest concern for many of the sUbjects was the
opinions and attitudes of their reference groups. A great
deal of the interactive segments of the programs were spent in
achieving some measure of consensus with those individuals
seated in their immediate surroundings. A majority of the
participants took positions that were relative and similar to
that of their peers and friends. During the interactive
continuum section of the program, it was my observation that
the majority of the participants did not take an extreme
position unless it was supported by others.
During the interviews, the full effect of Audience
Consensus/Reaction was explored. A great deal of conformity
was displayed and much of the concern for others seemed to be
affective in nature. The discussion within the smaller group
interviews exposed the varying degree to which the
participants were involved in classic conformity and social
comparison. The overwhelming majority of the subjects, 87
percent (N=32) used the audience as a reference group from
which to assess their attitudes concerning the issues
presented. The trend towards conformity and social comparison
8 Many of these responses were given by the same persons
during the interviews. The numbers indicate how many sUbj ects
either responded with statements similar to these quoted or
indicated agreement with the statements.
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will be addressed further in the General Implications for
Further Research section of this paper.
The ELM does not consider Audience
Reaction/Consensus to be of great importance to cognitive
information processing or in determining which route to
persuasion and information processing will occur. Rather,
this variable will determine whether the processing occurring
is biased or objective, with the implication being that biased
processing is more peripheral in nature and objective
processing is more central. The HSM considers Audience
Consensus/Reaction to work in the heuristic processing mode.
The difference between the models on this variable, is that
HSM considers it very important to processing, though in an
heuristic way (Chaiken, 1980; Eagly and Chaiken, 1984; Eagly
and Himmelfarb, 1978). The results from this study indicate
that this variable was more important than I had expected.
The impact of Audience consensus/Reaction was statistically
significant. The sUbjects indicated in the interviews that
they concentrated primarily on social comparison heuristic
cues when dealing with the information presented. The
importance granted Audience Reaction/Consensus by the sUbj ects
in my study lends support for the HSM's interpretation of its
value to information processing.
2. Motivation to Process: Motivation to Process
was specifically addressed by a question during the
interviews. There was a divergence along gender lines in the
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level of motivation, as noted in the Observations. While
65 percent (N=24) of the sUbjects interviewed believed
themselves to be high in Motivation to Process, women tended
to be higher in motivation to attend (74%, N=14/19) than men
(56%, N=10/18). In the initial examination of this
difference, it seemed that it might be an important
distinction, but there was no statistical significance with
regards to gender and Motivation to Process (X2=1.905, p>.lO).
Table 2: Relationship of Gender
to Motivation to Process
-Number High in Low in
-Row% Motivation to Motivation to
-Column% Process Process
X2=1.905, p>.lO
Females 14 5
74% 26%
58% 38%
Males 10 8
56% 44%
~ 42% 62%
In most of the studies examining these models, the
variable Motivation to Process is usually manipulated and
controlled for in order to determine the actual effect of the
variable on the cognitive processing of information. In my
study, the sUbjects were allowed to self-report their own
levels of Motivation to Process. Along with the self-reported
importance of this variable, the observations of the program
assisted in determining the sUbjects position relative to this
variable.
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The impact of Motivation to Process is difficult to
isolate in the "natural" setting because of its seemingly
strong association with Issue Involvement/Relevance. It
seemed to the researcher that those individuals who could be
designated "low" in Motivation to Process also tended to be
identified as "low" in Issue Involvement/Relevance. The
interaction effect of these two variables with be discussed
later in this paper.
Whether a sUbject was "high" or "low" in Motivation
to Process was clear during the observation stage of the
program by the manner in which the sUbject attended to the
presentation. The degree to which a participant was motivated
did not seem to affect his/her processing of information
beyond the gender differences in the focus about the program.
While all of the sUbj ects interviewed underwent similar
processes , individuals who could be designated as "low" in
motivation had a narrower focus about the program. Their
focus in the program usually revolved around examining
specific instances, examples or legal concerns directly
related to their own well-being. Rather than any demonstrable
concern for the general problem discussed, subjects "low" in
motivation were focused on self-interest with regard to the
issue presented.
The ELM and the HSM both consider Motivation to
Process to have an impact primarily on the central or
systematic processing ability of the sUbjects. In my study,
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the variable of Motivation to Process concentrated on
differences in focus about the issue. The importance of this
variable may have directed sUbjects towards the more active
course of processing, but unlike the interpretation of the
ELM, Motivation to Process was similar in importance to some
of the heuristic variables and did not determine the direction
of processing as the primary variable.
3. Prior Knowledge: This variable had an effect
that was not predicted by either model. According to the
research, it is expected that individuals who have Prior
Knowledge about an issue will be able to cognitively process
information rather than if the knowledge is lacking. Lack of
prior knOWledge is supposed to direct an individual towards
the heuristic/peripheral routes to information processing.
A minority of the sUbjects (14%, N=5) admitted to
learning entirely new information, but this may be the result
of the majority of the individuals having already been exposed
to the educational program at some time previously in their
university careers (86%, N=32). The relationship between
Prior KnowLedge and the importance with regard to information
processing was significant (X2=3.887, p=.05). The results of
this relationship are displayed in Table 3, below. The
sUbjects who received "new" information considered that
information to be important, as did the 59 percent of the
subjects who had Prior Knowledge about this information.
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Table 3: Relationship of Prior Knowledge
and Importance to Processing
-Number Variable Variable
-Row% Important to Not Important
-Column% Information to Information
X2=3. 887, p=.05 Processing Processing
SUbject had 19 13
Prior KnowLedge 59% 41%
79% 100%
SUbjects had no 5 0
Prior Knowledge 100% 0%
21% 0%
The majority of the "new" information regarded the
finding that other individuals hold differing viewpoints about
the issue of date and acquaintance rape. The expressing of
different attitudes about the issue presented by the
educational program often resulted in affective responses to
the situation. Frequently the question "Do you guys (men and
women) really think/concern yourselves with that?" was posed
from at least one of the subjects in the group. The finding
that existing attitudes differed from their own acted as
affective information concerning the program and the
situations discussed for much of the audience.
SUbjects who had participated in this educational
program at a previous occasion in their college career, were
less influenced by the different attitudes expressed. The
fact that other attitudes about rape and rape awareness exist
did not come as a surprise to these sUbjects. Those sUbjects
who had not been exposed to different attitudes about this
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issue were more affected and increased their processing
sUbstantially, as evidenced in the interaction during the
program and the discussion afterwards.
The models both hold that individuals who have Prior
Knowledge about an issue will engage in further cognitive
processing because they are in a better position to evaluate
the arguments. While this was supported because of the
debates which occurred between students who had been exposed
to this information previously, those subj ects that were
presented with "new" opinions and attitudes increased the
cognitive processing that they commenced. This was probably
an effort to evaluate the new information with regard to their
existing attitudes.
4. Issue Involvement/Relevance: As previously
noted, Issue Involvement/Relevance is often conceptually
linked to the variable Motivation to Process. A majority of
the participants considered this program to be of great
personal relevance to themselves (63%, N=23). The two
variables Motivation to Process and Issue
Involvement/Relevance were difficult to examine because they
each appear to influence the other. The relationship between
them was not statistically significant (X2=2.011, p>.lO). The
displayed results in Table 4, indicate that the majority of
the sUbjects measured "high" in both Motivation to Process and
Issue Involvement/Relevance, but those individuals "low" in
66
Issue Involvement/Relevance were split on Motivation to
Process.
Table 4: Relationship of Issue Involvement/Relevance
to Motivation to Process
-Number High in Low in
-Row% Motivation Motivation
-Column% to Process to Process
X2=2.011, p>.10
High in Issue 17 6
Involvement/ 74% 26%
Relevance 71% 46%
Low in Issue 7 7
Involvement/ 50% 50%
Relevance 29% 54%
This surprising result may be the consequence of the
method of measurement used in the study. There was no direct
measure of either Issue Involvement or Motivation; the study
is based on self-reported levels of these variables. Those
sUbj ects "low" in Issue Involvement and Motivation had a
narrow focus on specific issues that were especially of self-
interest.
The 46 percent of the subjects (N=17) who were
"high" in both of these variables displayed a great concern
for the issue and information on both a personal as well as a
general level. These sUbjects are concerned about the topic
as being of great general importance for everyone, while the
subjects designated as "low" are concerned primarily about
self-interest. Those individuals that were "high" in one and
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"low" in the other (N=13), explained there position as the
result of either distractions from outside the confines of the
program (e.g. a test the next day, etc.), or the issue was
just not relevant to them though they wanted to attend because
all of their friends were there.
As with the variable Motivation to Process, Issue
Involvement/Relevance is considered by both models to enhance
processing along the more active routes. similar to the
variable, Motivation to Process, the results found in this
study regarding Issue Involvement/Relevance indicate that this
variable could not direct the process towards primarily a
cognitive route as would be expected by the ELM and,
therefore, the HSM would seem to be of greater value in
investigating information processing.
B. Role of Affect
Affectively-linked information was presented during
two separate sections of the program. The discussion and
interaction segment of the program relied to a great deal on
participants contributing personal insights. The discussion
was directed by questions for which there was no "right"
answer and were estimated to provide affective information.
The other portion of the program that explored the issue via
affectively-linked information, was the statistics section.
The statistics, factual, were presented in combination with
affective testimony.
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affect.
Two of the targeted variables were associated with
First, Prior Knowledge consisted of opinions and
emotionally backed statements which were assessed during the
program and the interviews. Audience Reaction/Consensus was
considered primarily affective because the sUbjects reacted to
discussion that was regarded as personal in nature.
It was during the discussions that the role of
affect was established as significant. Ninety-one percent of
the sUbjects (N=34) considered two sections of the program as
of particular importance: the statistics section (N=10) and
the discussion portion (N=24) of the program. These two
sections of the program were found to be statistically
significant in relation to the targeted variables most
influenced by affect, Prior Knowledge and Audience
Reaction/Consensus. The information presented in Tables 5-8,
below illustrates the trends of the influence manifested in
these situations.
Table 5: Relationship of statistics to Prior Knowledge
-Number High in Low in
-Row% Prior Knowledge Prior Knowledge
-Column%
X2=12.641, p<.OO1
statistics 6 4
section 60% 40%
Most Interesting 19% 80%
statistics 26 1
section 96% 4%
Least Interesting 81% 20%
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Table 6: Relationship of Discussion to Prior Knowledge
-Number High in Low in
-Row% Prior Knowledge Prior Knowledge
-Column %
X2=3.887, p=.05
Discussion 23 1
section 96% 4%
Most Interesting 72% 20%
Discussion 9 4
section 69% 31%
Least Interesting 28% 80%
The Tables 5 and 6 presented above, consider the
responses regarding high and low Prior Knowledge with regard
to the two most affectively salient sections of the program:
the statistics and the Discussion sections. The trend
displayed in Table 5, indicates that high Prior Knowledge
influenced people to consider the statistics as least
interesting and in Table 6, the discussion section was the
most important. The low numbers in the sample may be
responsible for these findings and the statistically
significant relationship.
Below are Tables 7 and 8 which examine the
relationships of high and low attention to Audience
Reaction/Consensus with regard to the statistics and
Discussion sections. The trend displayed in Tables 7 and 8
was similar. Those participants that considered the Audience
Reaction/Consensus as important, tended to consider the
discussion section as the most important and the statistics
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section to be the least important. Again, due to the small
sample size, the significance may be affected.
Table 7: Relationship of statistics to
Audience Reaction/Consensus
-Number High in Low in
-Row% Audience Audience
-Column% Reaction/consensus Reaction/Consensus
X2=22. 473, p<.OOl
statistics 5 5
section 50% 50%
Most Interesting 16% 100%
statistics 27 0
section 100% 0%
Least 84% 0%
Interesting
Table 8: Relationship of Discussion to
Audience Reaction/Consensus
-Number High in Low in
-Row% Audience Audience
-Column% Reaction/Consensus Reaction/Consensus
X2=8. 747, p<.Ol
Discussion 24 0
section 100% 0%
Most Interesting 75% 0%
Discussion 8 5
section 62% 38%
Least 25% 100%
Interesting
A question was introduced that was concerned with
any proposed changes the subjects would like to see in the
program. While the majority of the individuals (78%, N=29)
did not recommend any changes, a portion of the sUbjects (22%,
N=8) requested more affective information. At some point in
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the discussion 70 percent of the sample indicated that affect
was important. They discussed the idea that the affective
statistics and the personally relevant and emotional stories
related by others in the audience made them think about the
issue more and brought home the message of the program most
effectively for them, however, this relationship was not
statistically significant (X2=3.311, p>.05).
As noted, Audience Consensus/Reaction and Prior Knowledge
were affectively concerned, as well as being an important part
•
of the information processing. The sUbjects in this study
considered the information that was emotional in nature (i.e.
personal stories, emotionally linked statistics, etc.) an
important force in how they evaluated the program.
Respondents consistently indicated that the affective
information was of great importance in their processing of the
material. This may be the result of the topic of this
educational program, but the fact that the majority of the
subjects relied on affective information in forming or
evaluating their attitudes and opinions indicates that affect
must play an important part in our decision making process.
In the discussions, 59 percent (N=22) of the
conversations revolved around personal experiences and
emotionally linked statistics.
significant (X~11.062, p<.OOl)~
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This relationship was
Table 9: Role of Affect - Relation of
Processing Affect to Importance
-Number Affect is Affect not
-Row% Important to Important to
-Column% Information Information
X2=11. 062, p<.OOl processing Processing
Considered 20 2
Affective 91% 9%
Argument 77% 18%
,
Did not 6 9
Consider 40% 60%
Affective 23% 82%
Argument
Table 9 displays the trend that these subjects who
considered affect important used it in processing the
information, while those individuals who did not consider
affect important did not utilize it in the information
processing. This trend may result from the fact that these
measures were self-reported because objective measurement of
the role of affect on decision making is nearly impossible.
My interpretation of the observations and the
interviews leads me to believe that the audience visibly
reacted to certain statistics that contained an emotional
appeal and it was obvious that any recounting of personal
experiences caused a distinct reaction in the audience. The
.....(
~.
impact of affect is not easily measured, yet the result of
exposure to emotionally charged information is evident.
People listen to personal stories and have to process the
information, if only to remove themselves from possible
inclusion in that type of situation. Obviously, affect is a
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powerful tool in persuasion and information processing which
needs further study.
The Role of Affect is considered by the ELM to
influence change via the peripheral route. According to the
model; affBct would be of little consequence if an individual
was involved in processing information via the central (more
cognitive) route. The importance expressed for the Role of
Affect by the sUbjects of this study would seem to indicate
that it plays a greater role than would be expected by the
ELM. The discussion related to the issue presented and affect
may have allowed for more cognitive processing due to the
importance and emphasis given the affective information. This
study has found that subj ects addressed the issue presented in
the educational program in both central/systematic and
peripheral/heuristic routes, especially with regard to affect.
This supports the importance of the HSM as a preferable
cognitive approach to information processing.
VIII. Summary and Final Remarks
The data gathered in this study provides more support for
the HSM, in comparison to the ELM, as a comprehensive model of
information processing. The most significant variables
identified by the subjects interviewed emphasize the
importance of both routes to persuasion and cognitive
information processing. The sUbjects indicated consideration
of both heuristics, as well as systematic cognitions.
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The sUbjects did not appear to consciously choose either
a central or peripheral route in processing the information
presented during the educational program nor did they consider
variables that were identified primarily with solely one
route. Instead, they seemed to use both cues and cognitions
in differing levels in determining their attitudes and
opinions throughout the program. This supports a parallel
approach in which a more cognitive method may be prevalent,
yet a simple cue decision making strategy also may be
employed. Both occurred in sUbject's processing during this
study, although in different degrees. While actively thinking
about the information presented (cognitive processing),
especially if it was new information, simple heuristic cues
were used in social comparison and conformity inducing
situations.
The variables determined to be significant in this study
contributed to different processing paths in the ELM and HSM.
The variables of Motivation to Process and Issue
Involvement/Relevance are identified as having primary
importance for more central processing in both models. The
variable identified as Prior Knowledge was more important to
the central route for the ELM and both the heuristic and the
systematic routes of the HSM. Audience Consensus/Reaction has
been predominately associated with the HSM and the heuristic
route of information processing. The role of Affect is
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considered by the ELM to contribute to the peripheral route
and in the HSM as a component of either route.
The process explored by the subj ects in this study
involved an inordinant amount of influence produced by affect.
This influence was cognitively processed by the majority of
the subjects. There were probably some participants who were
not affected by the emotional recounts and statistics, but the
sUbjects within the interview sessions universally attended to
the affective components of the presentation. The variables
within the process that were the most important have been
identified as variables affecting both cognitive/systematic as
well as heuristic processing. The sUbjects varied in their
attention to either systematic or heuristic variables. The
only trend seemed to represent use of both types of cues in
the operation of informational processing.
This ethnographic study did not isolate or control for
multi-variable interactions. The interviews were conducted in
an attempt to consider the different variables in a "natural"
setting, but a qualitative difference was established. This
study did not attempt to measure the extent of attitude
formation or change; rather, it concentrated on the "natural"
process as it occurred during an educational program. The
findings of this study indicates that the previous literature
and research may not be an accurate representation of how
individuals undertake informational processing in a
non-laboratory setting.
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IX. General Implications for Further Research
Several implications for further research are suggested
by this study. There are gaps in the present literature which
may only be addressed by further research conducted along
different lines than the classic cognitive approaches to
information processing.
There also is support within this study that demonstrates-
there is more happening than cognitive or non-cognitive
approaches to information processing. More research needs to
be done to better understand the connection between conformity
and informational processing. This study has found that the
variable Audience Reaction/Consensus plays an important role
in information processing. The theories involved in
conformity and social comparison may provide further support
in connection with information processing models. Exploration
of this connection between conformity and cognitive approaches
to attitudes may yield interesting conclusions.
Primarily, further work is needed in exploring the
importance of affect. This study indicates that individuals
may rely to a greater extent on emotion-producing information
than previously expected. The impact of affect as a
persuasive tool has been explored, but the usefulness of this
variable in cognitive approaches to information processing
needs additional analysis. As Wu and Shaffer (1987) stated:
"Strong emotional reactions stemming from affectively salient
and accessible attitudes may be an important spark that
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ignites both the generation and consolidation of those message
relevant elaborations that underlie persuasion according to
the central route." In other words, just as the HSM places
affect within the more systematic route, this study indicates
that affect plays a greater role in information processing
than any of the research has thus far suggested.
Also to be considered by future research is the direction
of causality with regard to the role of affect. The nature of
the topic of the presentation may generate affect, especially
with regard to programs addressing social concerns and
problems. The weakness of the construct of this study is that
if the program topic generated affect, it cannot then be
argued that the affect led to further processing because, in
effect, the processing led to the affect. Research needs to
be concerned with establishing a causal direction for affect
in a cognitive informational processing model. The role of
affect according to the findings of this study would seem to
increase processing, but it may be the affect was a result of
the topic being processed.
Further work in the area of affect may be valuable in
designing educational programs that provide the most effective
and efficient educational tools. Once a direction of
causality can be established, educational program could be
produced to utilize affect in ways that maximize cognitive
processing.
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Appendix B: Data Collection and Measures
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session Title:
--------Location:
-----------
Presenters:
Time: ---------
Sex: Male/Female Year in School: Fr./So./Jr./Sr. Age:
---
PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH MOST
APPROXIMATELY REFLECTS YOUR OPINION
AGREE DISAGREE
The presenter(s) was well prepared.
The presentation was organized in
a professional manner.
The presenter(s) manner was
friendly.
The program seemed too lengthy.
There was too much information
presented.
I agreed with the information
presented.
The rest of the~udience agreed
with the information presented.
The content of the presentation was
relevant and useful.
Based on what I had heard about it,
I wanted to attend this program.
I have heard much of this material
before.
This issue is very important to me.
Overall, I believe the session went
very well.
The session could have been:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
More detailed More general Expanded No change
Additional comments or suggestions:
-------------
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
I, , hereby agree to participate as a
sUbject in the research investigation on information
processing conducted by Darrin Halsey under the direction of
Professor Robert Rosenwein in the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology.
It has been explained to me that the purpose of the study
is to learn how different individuals choose to use or process
the information presented to them in the I.C.A.R.E. program.
The procedures which will be used in this study are
voluntary participation in an interview session following
participation in an I.C.A.R.E. program.
I understand that possible risks to me associated with
the study are inconvenience to me from a loss of the time
necessary for the interview session following the program, as
well as potential emotional risks due to any discussion of why
particular information affected me in any way.
I understand that the possible benefits to me from
participation in this study are an increased awareness about
what I choose to focus on when presented with information in
a program of this sort (i.e., the I.C.A.R.E. program). I also
understand that I may not receive any direct benefit from
participating in this study, but participation may help to
increase knowledge that may benefit others in the future.
Darrin Halsey (215)758-3812 has offered to answer any
questions that I may have about the study and what is expected
of me in the study.
I understand that any answers to questions will remain
confidential with regard to my identity.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that
I am free to withdraw from the study and terminate the
interview at any time without jeopardizing my relationship
with Lehigh University.
Problems that may result from my participation in this
study, may be reported to Linda F. Cope, Program
Administrator, Office of Research and Sponsored Programs,
Lehigh University, (215) 758-4861.
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I have read and understand the foregoing information.
I, the undersigned, have defined and fUlly explained the
investigation to the above sUbject.
Date
Date
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SUbject's Signature
Investigator's signature
In-depth Interview Format
1. Did you feel that the presenter(s) were well prepared?
Why?
2. Was the presentation orgpnized and well put together?
3. Did you
presentation
like the presenter(s)?
style?
What about their
4. Why did you attend this program?
5. Was the program too long? Was there too much information
presented?
6. Did you pay attention to the presenters? Why or why not?
7. What part of the program did you find most interesting
(did you learn the most from) and why?
8. What part of the presentation caught your attention/did
you pay attention to? Why?
9. Did you think about what was presented in this program?
Why or why not?
10. Did you learn anything new or different?
11. What was more important to you, the presenters 0plnlons
and viewpoints or the audiences opinions/viewpoints?
12. Was there any part of the presentation that you would
change? Why?
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Darrin Halsey was born in Oklahoma city, Oklahoma on
September 25, 1969. When he was six weeks old, his mother
returned to New York, where he grew up in Water Mill (on Long
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In 1991, he received a B. A. in International Careers from
Lehigh University, with a concentration of study in East Asian
Studies and a minor in Law and Legal Institutions .
. After graduation, Darrin remained at Lehigh University to
continue his education. He expects to receive a M.A. in
Social Relations in May 1993. During his graduate studies at
(
Lehigh, Darrin was a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to
Social Psychology, Introduction to sociology, and Terrorism
and the Media.
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Gryphon Society (1988-1990), Student Senate (1990-1991) and
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Concerned About Rape Everywhere), where he coordinated the
program his last two years (1991-1993).
Following his most recent graduation, Darrin intends to
pursue employment in the academic environment as a
Instructor/Professor of Social Sciences in a community
college.
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